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I. INTRODUCTION
A considerable regulatory, legislative and judicial battle has
coursed through the United States legal system since Congress en-
acted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA")1. While liability issues amongst gen-
erators and operators of contaminated sites were clarified fairly
t Associate, Mesirov GelmanJaffe Cramer &Jamieson, Philadelphia, PA;J.D.,
Rutgers University School of Law (1989); B.S., University of South Carolina
(1986). The views expressed in this Article are solely 'those of the author.
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 ("CERCLA') §§ 101-308, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
(291)
1
Penberthy: Progressing toward Clarificiation of Lender Liability under CERCL
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
292 ViLLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. VI: p. 291
quickly,2 lenders have had great difficulty assessing their risk under
CERCLA. Recently, courts and the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") have carved out rational interpretations
of the lender liability "safe harbor" contained in CERCLA.3 While
Congress has chosen not to clarify the exception, the author be-
lieves that recent federal court decisions and EPA action suggest a
trend toward broadening the scope of the exemption.
This Article first provides an overview of the purpose behind
CERCLA. It explores how conflicting policies have caught lenders
in a maze of legislative, regulatory and judicial ambiguity which af-
ter fifteen years is finally approaching a consensus. This Article
then discusses related state law claims as well as a state lender ex-
emption which closely mirrors the EPA Lender Rule. Finally, the
Article focuses on basic steps which a lender can take to reduce risk
at the beginning of a lending relationship to ameliorate concerns
about environmental contamination discovered after monies have
been exchanged and collateral pledged.
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA LEGISLATION
In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA which created a $1.6 bil-
lion superfund that enabled EPA to clean up various sites contami-
nated by hazardous waste. 4 Congress later increased the fund to
$8.5 billion pursuant to the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), 5 which was integrated with
CERCLA.
CERCLA seeks to hold all past and present owners or opera-
tors6 of a contaminated facility liable for clean-up costs. 7 CERCLA
2. See, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601-75, as amended Pub.L. 99-499, Title I, §§ 101,
114(b), 127(a), Tide V, § 517(c) (2), 100 Stat. 1615, 1652, 1774; Pub.L. 100-707,
Tide I, § 109(v), 102 Stat. 4710; Pub.L. 102-426, § 1, 106 Stat. 2174 (West 1994).
3. See CERCIA § 101(20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A). For a further discus-
sion of the lender liability exemption contained within CERCLA's definition of
"owner or operator," see infra note 14 and accompanying text.
4. CERCLA § 131, 42 U.S.C. § 9631, repealed by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1774 (1986).
5. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1774 (1986).
6. See CERCLA § 101 (20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A). For a further discus-
sion of CERCLA's definition of the term "owner or operator," see infra note 7, and
accompanying text.
7. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The relevant language of this section
provides:
[T]he owner and operator of a vessel or a facility.., shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
2
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section 107(a) provides that an owner or operator of a vessel or
facility where hazardous substances were disposed of shall be liable
for the costs of cleanup, damages and interest where remedial ac-
tion is required if a release 8 or threatened release of a hazardous
substance occurs.9 Courts have interpreted this liability provision as
calling for strict liability. Furthermore, courts interpreting the lia-
bility sections of CERCLA have sought to promulgate uniform rules
to ensure consistent enforcement of environmental legislation en-
acted by Congress.' 0 As a result, a federal common law has
emerged as a supplement to CERCLA.11
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruc-
tion, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
A lender may be deemed an owner through foreclosure, or an operator
through participation in management, and thereby be subject to CERCLA liability.
Michael A. Kahn & Mary C. Castle, Recent Developments in Lender Liability Litigation:
RICO, CERCLA and Aiding and Abetting, (PLI Comm. Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series, 1990). Courts may determine on a case-by-case basis the degree
of management required to classify a lender as an operator. Id.
Until recently, courts have shown great reluctance to allow a defendant with
potential CERCLA liability to escape litigating such matters regardless of whether
the suit has been brought by a governmental entity or for contribution by private
parties. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-
Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988). This interpretation is consistent with
congressional intent to allocate the financial burden for cleanup of toxic wastes
between those parties responsible for causing the contamination. See Southland
Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 998 (D.N.J. 1988). Unfortunately,
most lenders never foresaw exposure to borrower's environmental problems prior
to 1980.
8. A release includes any "spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emp-
tying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the
environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers and
other dosed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or con-
taminant)...." CERCLA § 101 (22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
9. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For a further discussion of the text
of this provision, see supra note 7.
10. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). As the court noted, "[in resolving
the successor liability issues ... the ... court must consider national uniformity;
otherwise, CERCLA aims may be evaded easily by a responsible party's choice to
arrange a merger or consolidation under the laws of the particular states which
unduly restrict successor liability." Id.
11. Id. at 91 (stating that sparseness of the legislative history "indicates that
Congress expected the courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the
statute."). See also United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193, 1201-02 (E.D.
Pa. 1989) (discussing the need for uniform federal rules when "the application of
state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program."); In re
3
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CERCLA section 107(b) carves out three exceptions to the lia-
bility provisions: a defendant shall not be held liable if the release
or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages re-
sulting therefrom are caused by: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of
war; or (3) an act of a third party not an employee or agent of the
defendant when the defendant exercises due care and takes precau-
tions against foreseeable acts. 12 Each defense is based on the fact
that the defendant lacks the requisite element of causation under
the strict liability doctrine.' 3
III. LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
A. Lender Liability Exemption
In addition to the three liability defenses provided in CERCLA
section 107(a), is another of utmost importance to lenders. In sec-
tion 101 (20), CERCLA provides that the term "owner or operator,"
does not include "a person, who, without participating in the man-
agement of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." 14 This de-
fense is actually created, therefore, through Congress' explicit ex-
ception of such parties from CERCLA's definition of "owner or
operator." However, Congress left the meaning of both "indicia of
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 31 (D. Mass.
1987) (noting that nature of CERCLA demands national uniformity).
12. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). This section also allows as a de-
fense any combination of these stated defenses. Id. § 107(b) (4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b) (4).
13. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985)).
Strict liability is defined as follows:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from
the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the
harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977).
14. CERCLA § 101 (20) (A) (iii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (iii). The definition
of "owner or operator," under CERCLA does specifically include:
[I] n the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to
bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar
means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately
beforehand.
Id. Thus, such parties are explicitly not permitted to use the lender liability
exemption.
4
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ownership," and "participation in management," for purposes of
being considered an owner or operator under CERCLA unclear.15
B. Court Interpretations of the Lender Liability Exemption
CERCLA liability is remedial in that it spreads the costs of re-
sponding to improper waste disposal among all parties that played a
role in creating the hazardous conditions. 16 Courts generally apply
the- CERCLA liability provisions accordingly, and reject attacks
based upon due process concerns.' 7 Such a broad and liberal con-
struction of CERCLA is consistent with Congress' goal of enacting
remedial legislation'18
In United States v. Monsanto Co.,19 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit carved out uniform federal rules
concerning apportionment of liability under CERCLA.20 The prin-
ciple espoused by the court provides that damages for harm must
be apportioned among two or more causes where there are distinct
harms or a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm; damages for any other harm cannot be
apportioned among two or more causes.21 The burden of establish-
ing a reasonable basis for apportionment lies with the party respon-
sible for generating the waste.22
Allegations containing lender liability issues are premised on
the contention that the lender is or was an owner or operator of a
15. Roslyn Tom, Note, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Management Participa-
tion Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YAtE L.J. 925, 926 (1989).
16. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 174.
17. See, e.g., id. (stating "retroactive application of CERCLA does not violate
due process"); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co, Inc.,
810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (stating that
"[c]leaning up inactive and abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites is a legiti-
mate legislative purpose, and Congress acted in a rational manner in imposing
liability for the cost of cleaning up such sites upon those parties who created and
profited from the sites and upon the chemical industry as a whole").
18. See generally Tanglewood East Homeowners, 849 F.2d at 1572-74 (construing
CERCLA terms "present owners," "facility," "disposal," and "treatment" broadly).
19. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
20. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172.
21. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172 (citing REATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433A (1965)).
22. Id. (citing United States v. ChemDyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio
1983)). Where the combination of tortious conduct of two or more actors causes a
single harm to a plaintiff, and one or more of those actors wants to limit his liabil-
ity on the ground that the harm is divisible, that actor has the burden of proof as
to apportionment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 433B (1965).
19951
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hazardous waste facility.23 The typical situation in which a lender is
named as a defendant occurs during a workout or after a lender
forecloses on contaminated real estate.2 4 The most difficult issue
arises within this context when a secured creditor must determine
what measures to take to protect its financial interests without being
found to have acted as an owner or operator within the meaning of
the statute. Courts have diverged over the proper standard to apply
when making this determination. A review of case law aids in un-
derstanding the implications of "management participation" and
"indicia of ownership" standards.
1. Exercise of Security Interest
The first reported case to deal with the lender exemption 25 to
CERCLA liability was In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc.26 The bank-
ruptcy court in T. P. Long stated in dicta that a secured lender,
("Bank"), would not incur owner or operator liability for toxic
waste if it had repossessed its collateral pursuant to a security agree-
ment because the Bank had not participated in "management."27
The issue was raised only marginally by EPA and no further expla-
nation of this analysis was given in the opinion.28
Judge Newcomer of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania developed the "management par-
ticipation" test in United States v. Mirabile,29 when he stated that par-
ticipation which is critical to finding a secured lender liable occurs
in operational, production, or waste disposal activities.30 Mere financial
23. James E. Spiotto, The Problem of Indentured Trustees and Bond Holders 1990:
Defaulted Bonds and Bankruptcy, (PLI Real Estate Law and Practice Course Hand-
book Series, 1990).
24. Se4 e.g. United States v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing
defense of secured creditor who took legal title through foreclosure); In re Berg-
soe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing liability of local port
authority during "workout" situation); Feet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1553; Kemp
Industries, Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 857 F. Supp. 373 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding de-
fendant who financed construction project through sale and leaseback was not
responsible party under CERCLA); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and MFG. Co.,
Inc., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (determining liability of bank prior to fore-
closure and purchase of site and period during bank's ownership).
25. See supra notes 14-15, and accompanying text.
26. 45 B.R. 278, 288 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
27. Id. at 288-89. The court noted that the only indicia of ownership that
could possibly be attributed to the Bank is "that which is primarily to protect its
security interest." Id. at 289.
28. Id. at 288. EPA asserted that the Bank was liable for EPA's costs, yet EPA
never expressly alleged that the Bank was an owner or operator under CERCLA.
Id.
29. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
30. Id. at 20,995 (emphasis added).
6
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ability to control waste disposal practices possessed by a secured
creditor was not deemed sufficient for the imposition of liability.31
The court did not discuss whether the creditor met the test for lia-
bility as an owner, and the case cannot be viewed as a complete
"safe harbor" for lenders who purchase property at a foreclosure
sale.32
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,3 3 the District
Court of Maryland dealt squarely with the definition of "owner or
operator" under CERCLA section 101 (20) (A).34 In Mayland Bank
& Trust, a secured lender foreclosed on contaminated property
and continued to hold the waste site at the time EPA initiated
suit.3 5 In finding the creditor liable for the costs of cleanup, the
court construed the CERCLA section 101(20) (A) exemption nar-
rowly.36 The court decided that "[t]he exemption of subsection
(20) (A) covers only those persons who, at the time of the cleanup,
hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in
the land."37 The court stressed the importance of the verb tense
31. Id. The level of participation in management by the secured creditor in
Mirabile was too attenuated to permit the imposition of liability. Id. In this situa-
tion, the participation was limited to financial decisions. Id.
In Mirabile, one of the creditors purchased contaminated property at a fore-
closure sale and four months later assigned the property to a buyer. Id. at 20,996.
The court held that securing the property against vandalism, showing it to prospec-
tive purchasers, and inquiring about the cost of waste disposal were done to pro-
tect ABT's financial position in the property and did not bring it under the
owner/operator liability provision. Id. at 20,996.
32. Kahn & Castle, supra note 7, at 460. In its analysis, the court focused
solely on operator status as a trigger for CERCLA liability and disregarded liability
as an owner. Id.
33. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
34. Id. at 575. The court noted that because CERCLA was to be interpreted
broadly to effect Congress' remedial goals, the burden of proof was on the lender
to establish entitlement to the security interest exemption. Id. at 578. For a fur-
ther discussion of CERCLA's definition of "owner or operator," see supra note 14
and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 575.
36. Id. at 579. The court also noted that the defendant had the burden of
proving that it was entitled to a statutory exemption to a congressionally imposed
rule of general liability. Id. at 578.
37. Maryland Bank & Trus4 632 F. Supp. at 579. The defendant, Maryland
Bank & Trust Company, argued that it was entitled to the benefit of the statutory
exemption for lenders because it acquired ownership of the contaminated site
through foreclosure on its security interest in the property and purchase of the
land at the foreclosure sale. Id. The court found the government's assertion, that
the defendant bank was not entitled to the exemption as a matter of law, more
persuasive, and held that the defendant was not relieved from liability by the ex-
emption found in CERCLA § 101(20) (A). Id. The court conduded that the credi-
tor did not purchase the property at the foreclosure sale to protect its security
interest, but rather to protect its investment. Id.
7
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used in the exclusionary language, emphasizing that the security
interest must exist at the time of the cleanup.38
The Maryland Bank & Trust court distinguished Mirabile based
on the time difference in the lender's ownership.3 9 The court
noted that in Mirabile, the lender assigned its mortgage almost im-
mediately and closed the transaction within four months of foreclo-
sure.4° Conversely, in Maryland Bank & Trust, the Bank purchased
the property at a foreclosure sale and still held title four years
later.41 The Maryland Bank & Trust court rejected Mirabiles broad
construction of CERCLA section 101 (20) (A), stating that a broad
construction would be contrary to the legislative history and poli-
cies of CERCLA.42
Courts have also faced the issue of whether a mortgagee bank
can use the security interest exemption to avoid CERCLA liability.
The case of Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Co.,
Inc.,43 involved a suit brought by residents of the Borough of Punx-
sutawney, Pennsylvania ("Borough") against BFG Electroplating
Company ("BFG").44 BFG subsequently filed a third-party com-
plaint against the past and present facility owners, including the
National Bank of the Commonwealth ("Bank") seeking indemnifi-
cation, contribution and response costs based upon toxic dis-
charges from BFG's plant.45 The District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania held that actions taken by the Bank prior to
foreclosure fell within CERCLA's secured lender exemption be-
cause the Bank did not participate in managerial aspects of the fa-
38. Id. The exclusion does not apply to former mortgagees currently holding
title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, at least when the former
mortgagee has held title for nearly four years and a full year before EPA begins
cleanup, as was the case in Maryland Bank & Trust. Id.
39. Id. at 580.
40. Id.
41. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 575.
42. Id. at 580 (stating legislative history counsels against generously reading
CERCLA § 101(20) (A) exclusion). The court, however, provided the creditor with
a potential safe harbor. The government brought a motion for summary judg-
ment seeking to preclude the creditor from avoiding liability by using the "inno-
cent land owner" defense found in CERCLA § 107(b) (3). Id. at 581. The court
denied the motion, holding that a lender is an "innocent land owner" if it can
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the damage caused by the release or
threat of release of hazardous substances was caused solely by an act or omission of
a third party, and that the [lender] exercised "due care" in light of all relevant
circumstances and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions by third
parties. Id.
43. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa., 1989).
44. Id. at 557. BFG was alleged to have unlawfully contaminated the environ-
ment, thereby causing personal injuries. Id.
45. Id.
8
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cility, but merely acted to protect its security interest in the
property.46 The court then determined that the security interest
exemption did not apply to a secured creditor who purchased its
security interest at a foreclosure sale.47
The Guidice court concurred with the decision in Mayland
Bank & Trust, noting that once the lender foreclosed and
purchased the property, the lender held it as an investment rather
than as a security interest and thus forfeited the benefit of the se-
curity interest exemption. 48 The court reasoned that extending the
secured lender exemption to lenders holding full title would frus-
trate the distribution of dean-up costs as allocated under CERCLA,
and shift the risks assumed in owning real property.49 Further-
more, the court stated that exempting "landowning lenders would
create a special class of otherwise liable land owners."50 Conse-
quently, lenders should be circumspect when contemplating fore-
closure and subsequent leasing of contaminated property.
2. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., and Its Fallout
Two subsequent Courts of Appeal decisions muddled the pa-
rameters of the lender liability exception under CERCLA. In United
46. Id. at 561-62. Interpretations of "participating in the management," and
"primarily to protect its security interest," permit secured creditors to provide fi-
nancial assistance and general, or even isolated specific management advice to
their debtors without risking liability under CERCLA, as long as the lender does
not actually participate in daily management. Id. at 561.
The court noted that prior to foreclosure, a mortgagee may benefit from the
secured lender exemption as long as the mortgagee did not participate in the
managerial and operational aspects of the facility. Id. These actions included
touring the plant with plant officials to discuss management, company accounts,
work shifts, the presence of raw materials and advocating that the company take
out a Small Business Administration loan to pay off debt and raise working capital.
Id. at 562. The court regarded these preforeclosure activities as inadequate to for-
feit the CEROLA security interest exemption, and noted that there was no evi-
dence to indicate that the Bank controlled operations, production, or waste
disposal activity. Id. Rather, the measures taken by the Bank were consistent with
a desire to protect its security interest in its property. Id.
47. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 562-63. The Bank foreclosed on the property and
purchased it at sheriff's sale, leased the property to a new manufacturer and began
receiving rental payments. Id. at 559. Approximately eight months later the Bank
deeded the property to a trust which had been formed to manage the rental in-
come and continued to receive payments through the trust, which reduced the
original loss from the default on the loan. Id.
48. Id. at 563.
49. Id.
50. Id. The fact that Congress did not specifically provide for a mortgagees-
turned-landowners exemption in the 1986 SARA Amendments strongly indicated
to the court that such an exemption would contradict Congressional intent. Id.
19951
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States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,5' EPA sued Swainsboro Print Works
("SPW"), SPW's two principal officers, and SPW's secured lender
("Fleet Factors") for the costs of cleaning up SPW's toxic waste
site.52 Fleet Factors foreclosed on its security interest and subse-
quently auctioned off SPW's machinery and equipment.53 Thereaf-
ter, EPA inspected and began to clean up the SPW site.54 EPA then
sued all parties for recovery of the clean-up costs. 55
Reiterating the Congressional policy behind CERCLA to place
the ultimate responsibility for cleaning up hazardous wastes on
those parties responsible for problems caused by improper dispo-
sal, the court denied Fleet Factors' motion for summary judgment
which sought to dismiss EPA's claim, despite the fact that Fleet did
not own or control the facility between December 1983 and July
1987 when the property was sold.56 The court noted that it was
Fleet Factors' burden to prove its entitlement to the security inter-
est exemption from CERCLA liability and that Fleet Factors had not
presented any evidence concerning the nature and extent of its in-
volvement.5 7 The court proceeded to adopt a standard whereby the
trier of fact focuses on whether a lender's participation in financial
management of a facility indicates "a capacity to influence" the cor-
poration's practices concerning treatment and disposal of hazard-
51. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
52. Id. at 1552-53. SPW ran a cloth printing business until 1979 when it filed
for Chapter 11 reorganization. Id. at 1552. Fleet Factors continued to finance the
debtor until early 1981. Id. Subsequently, the case was converted to a Chapter 7
proceeding and the Bankruptcy Court appointed a trustee. Id.
53. Id. at 1552-53.
54. Id. at 1553. EPA found 700 fifty-five gallon drums containing toxic chemi-
cals and 44 truckloads of material containing asbestos. Id. EPA incurred nearly
$400,000.00 in clean-up costs. Id.
55. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1553.
56. Id. at 1555. EPA urged the court to adopt a literal interpretation of the
lender liability exemption that would exclude any secured lender that participates
in any form of facility management. Id. at 1556. Fleet Factors, on the other hand,
asserted that the court should distinguish between permissible participation in fi-
nancial management and impermissible participation in the daily or operational
management of a facility. Id. The court rejected the government's narrow inter-
pretation finding that, "it would largely eviscerate the exemption Congress in-
tended to afford to secured creditors . . . . To adopt the government's
interpretation of the secured creditor exemption could expose all such lenders to
CERCLA liability for engaging in their normal course of business." Id.
57. Id. at 1555-56 (citing Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 578). There
was no dispute that Fleet Factors held indicia of ownership in the facility through
its deed of trust to SPW and that this interest was held essentially to protect its
security interest in the facility. Id. at 1556. Thus, the critical issue was whether
Fleet Factors participated in management sufficiently to incur liability under CER-
CLA. Id.
10
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ous waste.58 Accordingly, the Fleet Factors court held that a secured
creditor will be held liable if its management activities are suffi-
ciently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous
waste disposal decisions if it chose to do so.59 The court indicated
that this construction of the secured lender exemption gives lend-
ers some latitude in their dealings with debtors without exposing
them to CERCLA liability.60
The Ninth Circuit subsequently addressed the CERCLA section
101 (20) (A) secured lender exemption in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.61
In Bergsoe, a municipal corporation, the Port of Saint Helens
("Port"), foreclosed on municipal bonds which it had raised to sup-
port a lead recycling plant built to promote industrial development
in the Saint Helens, Oregon area.62 The lead recycling plant failed
financially, and a creditor of the plant's builder put the builder into
involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 11 after workout attempts
failed. 63 The Port subsequently filed a summary judgment motion
to determine that it was not an owner or operator of the lead re-
cycling plant under CERCLA.64
The court held that the Port was not an owner or operator for
purposes of CERCLA.65 Although the Port had legal title to the
58. Id. at 1557. The court explained that "[i] t is not necessary for the secured
creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order
to be liable - although such conduct will certainly lead to the loss of the protec-
tion of the statutory exemption." Id. at 1557-58.
59. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558. Thus, the Feet Factors court expressly re-jected the interpretation of the secured lender exemption espoused by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Mirabile. Id. The court stated that
its narrow construction of the exemption is supported by the limited legislative
history available on the subject. Id. (citing S. 1489, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
2 Senate Comm. On Environmental and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2 Sess., 1 A
LEGIsLATIrv HISrORY OF CERCLA 470 (Comm. Print 1983)).
60. Id. Nothing precludes a secured lender from monitoring any aspect of a
debtor's business. Id. Also, a secured lender may occasionally make decisions re-
lating to protecting its security interest without incurring liability. Id.
61. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
62. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 669-70.
63. Id. at 670.
64. Id. The Port argued that it did not own the plant for CERCLA purposes
and, therefore, it had no CERCLA liability. Id. The court noted that, in one sense
the Port owned the plant because the deed to the property was in its name. Id.
Yet, the Port asserted that it was not a CERCLA owner because it fell within the
security interest exemption. Id. The court stated that the Port could only prevail
on summary judgment if the undisputed facts demonstrated that the Port held
indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest in the plant and that
the Port did not participate in plant management. Id.
65. Id. at 673. The court found no material issue of fact, and concluded that
the Port held indicia of ownership primarily to protect its security interest and did
not participate in plant management. Id.
11
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property, it never participated in any management decisions con-
cerning the ficility.66 Therefore, the Bergsoe court explicitly with-
held ruling on the viability of the Fleet Factors "capacity to influence"
test because "there must be some actual management of the facility
before a secured creditor will fall outside" the security interest ex-
emption, and here there was none.67 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit
held that the critical inquiry is not what rights the secured lender
holds, but what the secured lender does.68
This decision gives secured lenders hope that a more rational
test than the "capacity to influence" decisions enunciated in Fleet
Factors will prevail. Bergsoe implicitly held that even if a lender owns
the property, regardless of what its capacity to influence may be, the
determination of liability rests on what it has actually done. The
problem for lenders after the Bergsoe holding is that Fleet Factors is
the only Court of Appeals case to deal directly with the security in-
terest exemption. In the absence of direction from either Congress
or the Supreme Court regarding the proper construction of the
CERCLA security interest exemption, courts have been forced'to
fashion their own concepts of this exception. As a result, there is a
lack of judicial consistency on the issue.
In the wake of Fleet Factors, some courts have chosen to limit the
harshness of, or to ignore the Eleventh Circuit's "capacity to influ-
ence" test. In Northeast Doran, Inc. v. Key Bank of Maine,69 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lender ("Key Bank") was pro-
tected under CERCLA section 101 (20) (A), without examining the
creditor's capacity to control.70 In Doran, Key Bank sold contami-
nated property at a foreclosure sale without informing the pur-
chaser about the environmental problem.7' The plaintiff alleged
that Key Bank was not entitled to CERCLA's security interest holder
exemption because of its knowledge of potential contamination
prior to and at the time of sale.72 The court stated that, "[wihile
Key [Bank], having obtained a judgment of foreclosure on the
property, might appear at first glance to be an 'owner' or 'operator'
66. Bergsoe, 901 F.2d at 672.
67. Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the court refused to consider the
argument that the Port had the capacity to exercise fights under the lease such as
inspection, re-entry and taking possession of the property upon foreclosure be-
cause nearly all secured creditors reserve these rights. Id.
68. Id.
69. 15 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
70. Id. at 2-3.
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. The lower court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id.
12
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of the property for purposes of section 9607(a), CERCLA's defini-
tion provisions clearly dictate otherwise."73 The court explained
that the exemption is designed to shield from liability those "own-
ers" who are in essence lenders holding title only as a security inter-
est for the debt.74 Accordingly, the court held that mere possession
of an environmental audit showing contamination and transfer of
title at a foreclosure sale did not remove Key Bank from the reach
of CERCLA's secured lender exemption. 75 Although practitioners
should not advise their lending clients to withhold disclosure in ju-
risdictions that require sellers to come forward with relevant
problems related to real estate sales, they should warn buyers to
carefully evaluate due diligence practices prior to making any
purchase. 76
In United States v. McLamb,77 EPA brought suit against landown-
ers for response costs incurred in the cleanup of a contaminated
site.78 The landowner defendants subsequently filed a third-party
complaint against Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., N.A. ("Wachovia")
for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied warranty
and contribution under CERCLA and North Carolina law.79 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wachovia on
73. Dornan, 15 F.3d at 2 (citing CERCLA § 101(20) (A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20) (A)).
74. Id. at 2 (citing Waterville Indus., Inc. v. Finance Auth. of Maine, 984 F.2d
549, 552 (1st Cir. 1993)). Furthermore, the court stated:
[S]o long as the [security interest holder] makes a reasonably prompt
effort to divest itself of its unwelcome ownership, we think continued cov-
erage under the exception serves its basic policy. to protect bona fide
lenders and to avoid imposing liability on owners who are not in fact
seeking to profit from the investment opportunity normally presented by
prolonged ownership.
Id. at 2-3 (quoting Waterville, 984 F.2d at 553).
75. Id. at 3.
76. SeeJeffrey M. Sharp, Environmental Lender Liability: Evaluating Risks Facing
Residential Lenders Under Common Law Theories, 23 Real Est. L. J. 236, 240 (W.G.L.
1994) ("Failure to disclose latent defects can support two primary theories of negli-
gence and misrepresentation.!).
77. 5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993).
78. Id. at 71.
79. Id. at 70. After Wachovia exercised its rights as beneficiary under a deed
of trust and foreclosed on a property whose owner was in default, sale of the prop-
erty was conducted according to state law. Id. However, there was no bidder at the
sale other than Wachovia. Id. As a result, Wachovia purchased the land solely to
protect its security interest and soon thereafter contracted with realtors to sell the
property. Id. Wachovia did not attempt to develop or manage the property follow-
ing foreclosure. Id. The district court concluded that Wachovia had no knowl-
edge of the contamination on the property prior to taking a security interest. Id.
19951 303
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the ground that Wachovia was exempt from liability under the se-
curity interest exemption. 80
In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit refused to
interpret the exemption narrowly.81 The McLamb Court drew an
analogy to Bergsoe, and reasoned that Wachovia, like the lender in
Bergsoe, took title to contaminated property for financial security
reasons and not to profit from the underlying business.8 2 The
McLamb decision clarified efforts to foreclose on contaminated
property and carved a broad exemption for lenders who take title
to market and sell the property.
The district court in Kelley Ex. Rel. Michigan Natural Resources
Commission v. Tiscornia,83 upheld the application of CERCLA's
lender exemption where the lender, in exchange for continued fi-
nancing, required the debtor to make daily reports, prohibited
outside financing, banned dividends, and was granted a blanket
lien on all machinery and equipment.8 4 The court granted sum-
mary judgment for the bank pursuant to the security interest excep-
tion of CERCLA and the EPA lender liability rule.85 The Kelley
court rejected a narrow reading of the exclusion from liability for
persons who "without participating in the management of a vessel
or facility, hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect securing
interests in the vessel or facility."8 6 Daily monitoring and sugges-
tions concerning the debtor's financial condition were insufficient
80. Id. The appellant landowners maintained that Wachovia was liable for
clean-up costs as an "owner" of the contaminated site and should not benefit from
the security interest exemption. Id. They further argued that Wachovia should
not benefit because it did not act in a commercially reasonable manner after it
took title to the property. Id.
81. McLamb, 5 F.3d at 72 (citing Watenrille 984 F.2d at 552). The appellants
argued that Wachovia should not be able to rely on the secured lender exemption
because as a result of the foreclosure sale, the bank owned the property for at least
several months. Id. Once the bank exercised its rights under the deed of trust, the
appellants argued, the bank lost its status as one who holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect its security interest. Id. The court rejected this narrow inter-
pretation, explaining that there is nothing in CERCLA itself that mandates a read-
ing of the security interest exemption to "apply solely to the dassic mortgagor/
mortgagee arrangement." Id.
82. Id. The McLamb court noted that the Bergsoe court stated that "under the
security interest exception the court must determine why the creditor" holds such
indicia of ownership. Id. (quoting Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 671).
83. 810 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
84. Id. at 903. The bank even recommended a turnaround specialist who was
hired and ran the company as President and CEO for nearly two years. Id.
85. Id. at 909. For a discussion of the EPA lender liability rule, see infra notes
133-54, and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 905 (citing CERCLA § 107(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2)). The
court stated that in deciding this case, it was necessary to analyze the actual role
played by the lender in the management of the company at the time. Id.
14
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to impose CERCLA liability, and the lender could be shielded by
the security interest exception.87
IV. CERCLA EXEMPTION READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH STATE LAW
UNDER LEASEBACK ARRANGEMENTS
A. Application of Leaseback Arrangements to CERCLA
A recent district court opinion, Kemp Industries, Inc. v. Safety
Light Corp.,s8 furthers the trend of broadening the lender exception
under CERCLA, and applies a similarly broad standard allowing a
lender to vigorously pursue its security interest under the recently
enacted lender exception to the New Jersey Spill Compensation
and Control Act ("Spill Act").89 In Kemp, the plaintiff brought a
recovery action under CERCLA and the Spill Act against several
parties, including the Prudential Insurance Company of America
("Prudential"). 90 Prudential had financed the debtor's property,
formerly the site of a radium processing plant, through the use of a
sale-leaseback arrangement, whereby Prudential took title to the
property and leased it back to the debtor under a long term lease
which vested control over the property with the debtor.91
The Kemp court described a leaseback arrangement as akin to a
mortgage financing arrangement in that the leaseback benefits a
debtor because the restrictions imposed under a traditional lending
arrangement are not present.92 Because insurance companies and
pension funds normally invest in such deals and are interested
solely in a financial return, the debtor has the same broad control
over the property as it would with formal ownership.93 In holding
the lender exemption applicable to Prudential, the court relied on
the Bergsoe line of cases which broadly applied the exemption. 94
87. Kelly, 810 F. Supp. at 909. The court noted that "individually and collec-
tively, the indicia relate to financial or administrative aspects of the business, as
opposed to the operational aspects necessary for a finding of liability .... Id.
88. 857 F. Supp. 373 (D.Nj. 1994).
89. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (West 1994).,
90. Kemp, 857 F. Supp. at 374.
91. Id. at 378-82. Industrial contaminants continued to be disposed of at the
property during Prudential's ownership under the "leaseback." Id. at 376.
92. Id. at 376-77. Commercial mortgage financing generally requires 25% eq-
uity in the property after the loan is made.
93. Id. at 377. The plaintiffs contended that Prudential was an owner when
hazardous substances were disposed of at the property. Id. at 384. Prudential
countered that it was never a CERCLA owner or operator because it held indicia of
ownership solely to protect its security interest in the lease. Id.
94. Kemp, 857 F. Supp. at 385. For a further discussion of the Bergsoe line of
cases, see supra notes 61-87, and accompanying text.
1995]
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Citing a congressional report concerning the exemption, the court
stated:
The fact that a party garners secondary benefits from its
ownership of the property, such as depreciation of the
property for tax purposes, will not void its entitlement to
the exemption. As one congressional report noted: "[A]
financial institution which held title primarily to secure a
loan but also received tax benefits as the result of holding
title would not be an "owner" as long as it did not partici-
pate in the management or operation of the vessel or
facility."95
Thus, the Kemp court approved alternative mortgage-type financing
arrangements. 96 The court used a favorable test for determining
whether Prudential had the "capacity to influence" environmental
or operational aspects of the property through the leaseback ar-
rangement.97 The court framed the dispositive issue as: "In ad-
ministering the [leaseback] Program, Prudential acted as a
financier and was not interested in owning or operating an indus-
trial facility. In fact, as a financier, and not a chemical manufac-
turer, Prudential did not have the capacity to operate an industrial
facility of the type constructed on Lot 13."98 By approving a lease-
back arrangement, Kemp ignored the holdings in Guidice and May-
land Bank & Trust, since the leaseback arrangement was held by the
lender for investment purposes only. This holding closely reflects
sound business practices in light of the fact that a lender always
"invests" in a debtor's business. Courts holding to the contrary ig-
nore business reality and discourage real estate lending.
B. Leaseback Arrangement Under the Spill Act
The New Jersey Legislature passed the New Jersey Spill Com-
pensation and Control Act ("Spill Act") 99 to "control the transfer
and storage of hazardous substances in NewJersey."100 The legisla-
tion is remedial and thus is applied retroactively.101 The Spill Act
95. Id. at 385 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1016,96th Cong., 2d Sess (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6181).
96. Id. (citing Waterville, 984 F.Sd at 552).
97. Id. at 389-90.
98. Kemp, 857 F. Supp. at 390 (footnotes omitted).
99. Spill Compensation and Control Act ("Spill Act"), NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-
23.11-:10-24 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
100. Id. § 58:10-23.11a.
101. Kemp, 857 F. Supp. at 396-97 (noting "curative" nature of Spill Act's
provisions).
16
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provides a remedy for private litigants to the extent that it is not
preempted by GERCLA. 10 2 The Spill Act also allows the NewJersey
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy to sue, for
remedial costs, any person who discharged a hazardous substance
or is in any way responsible for any hazardous substance.' 0 3 Like
CERGLA, the New Jersey Spill Act contains an exemption for se-
cured creditors. 10 4 The Spill Act exemption provides:
A person who maintains indicia of ownership of a vessel or
facility primarily to protect a security interest in a vessel or
facility and who does not participate in the management
of the vessel or facility is not deemed to be an owner or
operator of the vessel or facility, shall not be deemed the
discharger or responsible party for a discharge from the
vessel or facility and shall not be liable for cleanup costs or
damages resulting from discharges from the vessel or facil-
ity ... except to the extent that liability may still apply to
holders after foreclosure as set forth in section 3 of this
act.105
The terms of art in this exemption are defined and elaborated
more fully in other sections of the Spill Act and provide a foreclos-
ing mortgagee a minimum of five years to sell the property so long
as "commercially reasonable" steps are taken to assess contamina-
tion problems and liquidate the lender's debt through sale or lease
of the property. 06
While the Spill Act's exemption is more specifically defined
than CERCLA section 101 (20) (A), the Kemp court, citing the simi-
larities with CERCLA, held that both exemptions should be applied
consistently.10 7 The Kemp court cited several salient sections of the
Spill Act, specifically that lease financing transactions are protected,
so long as title is held to protect a security interest and that partici-
pation in management means "[actual] participation in manage-
ment ... or operational affairs... and shall not include the mere
capacity, or ability to influence, or the unexercised right to control
102. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 534 A.2d 1, 2-3 (NJ. 1987).
108. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(f) (a) (2).
104. Id. § 58:10-23.11(g) (5).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 58:10-23.11(g) (6) (d).
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vessel or facility operations." 08 This language directly contradicts
the Fleet Factors court's analysis.' 0 9
The Kemp case is a first-impression application of the lender
exemption as contained in the New Jersey Spill Act. The court's
analysis is consistent with the recent broadening of the CERCLA
exemption pursuant to section 101(20) (A) and the Spill Act ex-
emption's language which provides more detailed guidance than
CERCLA. The judicial trend to broadly construe lender exemp-
tions since Fleet Factors indicates that lender's efforts to challenge
adverse rulings have begun to bear consistent results.110
V. STATE LAW CLAIMs, PREEMPTION AND THE EPA RuLE
A. Common Law Aiding and Abetting Claims: Possible
Circumvention of CERCLA Lender Liability Exemption
A related area of environmental exposure was at issue in Friends
of Sakonnet v. Dutra,"' and O'Neil v. Q.L.C.RI, Inc.,"12 two federal
district court cases from Rhode Island. In O'Neil, a citizens' group
and the Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island brought
suit against the developers and residents of a housing development,
a trust corporation formed to operate and maintain the sewage
treatment plant for the development, and two lenders that held
mortgages on real property located within the boundaries of the
development."13 The initial complaint sought declaratory, injunc-
tive and monetary relief for violations of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA"), 1 4 and the tort of common law
nuisance. 115
In Sakonnet, discharges of raw, untreated sewage were pumped
from a development directly into the Sakonnet River located in
108. Id. at 398.
109. For a further discussion of Fleet Factors, see supra notes 51-60 and accom-
panying text.
110. Perhaps more significantly, the Spill Act exemption could be utilized as a
workable model for any future Congressional efforts.
111. 738 F. Supp. 623 (D.RI. 1990).
112. 750 F. Supp. 551 (D.RI. 1990).
113. Friends of Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 627-28 (setting forth background of
O4eiI.
114. Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA"), 62 Stat. 1155 (1948)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1993)).
115. Friends of Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 627. A plaintiff may recover damages
for nuisance in tort from the parties creating the nuisance as well as any successor-
in-interest who maintains the nuisance. Id. A violation of the FWPCA will result
from a discharge of an effluent into navigable waters which causes contamination.
See FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
18
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Portsmouth, Rhode Island, continuously for twenty years." 6 The
court held that this was a nuisance per se and that an action under
the FWPCA was proper against all parties except the two lenders.'17
The Sakonnet plaintiffs conceded that the lenders would not be
liable unless they foreclosed on their mortgages." 8 The plaintiff in
O'Neil took a very different position, however. In O'Neil one of the
two lenders, Davisville Credit Union ("Davisville"), brought a mo-
tion to dismiss the complaint, contending that the claims against it
did not present ajusticiable case or controversy because they had
not foreclosed on their mortgage." 9 The ONeilplaintiff sought de-
claratory injunctive relief and amended their complaint to include
a count against Davisville for aiding and abetting, 120 contending
that Davisville aided in violating the FWPCA and state nuisance
law.12 The court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend, holding
that the common law concepts of aiding and abetting advanced the
goals of the FWPCA and that the FWPCA did not preempt state
claims based on this thoery. 22 While the court agreed that prior to
foreclosure the lender could not be held directly liable under the
FWPCA and common law nuisance claims, it also held that the
plaintiff had alleged sufficient involvement and possible control by
the Bank over the development of sewage treatment practices to
present a viable claim of aiding and abetting. 123 Accordingly, the
court rejected Davisville's argument that the FWPCA bars aiding
and abetting claims.' 24
116. Friends of Sakonne, 738 F. Supp. at 626.
117. Id. at 636.
118. Id. at 626, n.3.
119. O'Nei 750 F. Supp. at 553.
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) provides the standard for
aiding and abetting liability: for harm resulting to a third person from the tortious
conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he knows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other. Id.
121. O'NeK 750 F. Supp. at 553-54. The plaintiff sought to use the common
law concept of aiding and abetting to find Davisville in violation of federal and
state statutory and common law. Id. at 554. Plaintiff alleged that Davisville "collab-
orated in a scheme to lend money to a borrower in the name of another," and that
Davisville had "influence and control" over principal polluters because Davisville
knew of the contamination and could have conditioned loans on remedying the
problem. Id.
122. Id. at 555 (citing Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co. of North America, 824
F.2d 1349 (3d Cir. 1987)). The O'Nei court acknowledged that the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the FWPCA preempts the federal common law of public
nuisance, but stated that it does not necessarily follow that the FWPCA preempts
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This opinion is troubling to lenders because it opens the door
for lender liability in a fashion similar to Fleet Factors. It is poten-
tially more vexing than Fleet Factors, however, because courts have
broadened the CERCLA section 101 (20) (A) exemption, and EPA
has promulgated interpretive regulations which state that the "ca-
pacity to influence" a debtor's facility is not enough to bring a se-
cured lender under the CERCLA liability provisions. 125 More
problematic is the possible use of aiding and abetting theories by
plaintiffs to reach the "deep pockets" of lenders even when they
cannot sue a lender for actually violating a pollution act or creating
a nuisance. 126
The O'Neil court's opinion takes on special significance be-
cause of the SARA amendments, which limited the application of
the preemption doctrine in CERCLA actions as enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court.127 In Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 28 the
Supreme Court held that a tax enacted by the New Jersey legisla-
ture for financing the Spill Act was preempted by federal law where
the Spill Act and CERCLA overlapped.129 This litigation arose
when Exxon challenged the funding mechanism for the Spill Act
contending that former CERCLA section 114(c) preempted the
Spill Act.130 While the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized the
repeal of CERCLA section 114(c) by the SARA amendments on re-
mand,' 3 1 the policy implications of allowing common law actions to
redress injuries and damages are clear. EPA was allocated more
than eight billion dollars for CERCLA cleanup and enforcement
actions under the SARA amendments. Congress sought to place
EPA in a supervisory role with the ability to respond to emergencies
when needed but its primary role was to charge those "responsible"
for cleanup costs. While CERCLA and state law liability for cleanup
of toxic waste is a problem which should be addressed when consid-
ering a loan application or foreclosure on a property, EPA names a
125. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992).
126. SeeJohn Voorhees & Robert M. Steele, Birth of a New Lender Liability The-
ory? Aiding and Abetting a Borrower's Violation of Environmental Laws, 6 Toxics L. Rep.
(BNA) 950, 954 (1992) (authors comment that aiding and abetting theories bear
striking resemblance to Reet Factors' "capacity to influence" test).
127. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
128. Id.
129. Hunt, 475 U.S. at 376-77.
130. Id. at 358-59.
131. See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 534 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1987).
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small number of lenders as compared to other potentially responsi-
ble parties in suits under CERCLA.' 32
B. EPA Final Rule Defining Lender Liability Under CERCLA
EPA's final regulations defining the secured creditor exemp-
tion were promulgated because of the uncertainty stemming from
the various cases, including Fleet Factors, interpreting section
101 (20) (A) of CERCLA.' 33 The EPA rule defines "indicia of owner-
ship" as those interests in real or personal property held as security
or collateral for a loan, including real or personal property ac-
quired in the course of protecting the security interest.'3 Exam-
ples of "security interests" may include, but are not limited to: (1)
mortgages, deeds of trust, or legal title obtained pursuant to fore-
closure or its equivalence; and (2) assignments, liens, pledges or
other rights to or encumbrances against facilities furnished by bor-
rowers as security for loans.' 3 5
The EPA rule states that a mortgage must be obtained for the
purpose of protecting a security interest as opposed to increasing
the return on an investment 3 6 It defines the phrase "primarily to
protect the security interest," as an ownership interest which repre-
sents a true security interest as opposed to a lease or consign-
ment. 37 To protect a security interest, the lender must focus its
activities on repayment of the loan as opposed to enhancement of
its investment.138 The EPA rule also provides that the secured
lender exemption will not apply where a lender acts as a trustee or
manager of property or a business or where it acts in a non-lending
capacity or as any interest other than one created as a bona fide se-
curity interest.'3 9 Financial workouts and foreclosures followed by
132. The data showed that out of 17,095 potentially responsible parties at
more than 1200 superfund sites, only 40 lenders (.2%) of all potentially responsi-
ble parties were named. This may change depending on EPA's funding priorities
and the fact that EPA was allocated only 10% of the funds estimated at the time the
study was conducted to clean up toxic wastes and SARA encourages state, local and
private participation in clean-up matters. Exxon, 534 A.2d at 9, 11-13 (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 55 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.S.CA.N.
1835). But see 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (final EPA rule on lender liability attempting
to clarify lender activity boundaries).
133. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992).
134. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a).
135. Id. § 300.1100(b) (1), (c)(2), (d).
136. Id. § 300.1100(b) (1).
137. Id.
138. Compare Kelley v. Tiscornia, 810 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (mort-
gage and accounts receivable financing) with Kemp, 857 F. Supp. at 373 (leaseback
financing falls under CERCLA lender exception).
139. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1).
19951
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expeditious liquidation of assets are permissible and do not consti-
tute participation in the management of the facility provided that
the actions taken are necessary to protect the security interest, as
defined under the EPA rule.140 In EPA's view, a lender is primarily
protecting its security interest during a loan workout when it
restructures or renegotiates the terms of the loan obligation, re-
quires payment of additional interest, extends the payment period,
provides specific financial or operational advice, suggestions, coun-
seling, guidance or any other action reasonably necessary to protect
the lender's security interest. 141 The regulation provides, however,
that the lender's actions must consider and account for hazardous
substances known to be present at the facility and must not cause or
contribute to the environmental harm.' 42 Most importantly, the
borrower must remain the ultimate decision maker concerning op-
erations of the facility.' 43 If the lender takes over the decision mak-
ing or directs an environmental compliance program, they will
forfeit the exemption.'" Equally important is the fact that during
the course of a loan workout or foreclosure, EPA specifically rejects
the "capacity to influence" test promulgated by Fleet Factors, and for
purposes of an EPA initiated suit, would not seem to be motivated
to pursue lenders who have complied with the rules. Finally, the
regulation addresses the innocent landowner defense under CER-
CLA section 107(b) (3) which provides:
there shall be no liability under § 107(a) for a person who
can establish ... that the release or threat of release of a
hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by-
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than...
one whose act or omission occurs in connection with
the contractual relationship existing directly or indi-
rectly with the defendant... if... (a) he [the defend-
ant] exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance .... and (b) he took precautions against
140. Id. § 300.1100(c) (2) (ii) (B). In addition, EPA appears to encourage
lenders to remediate waste site contamination pursuant to CERCLA section
107(d) (1). Id. § 300.1100(d) (3) (ii).
141. Id. § 300.1100(c) (2) (U), (B).
142. Id. § 300.1100(c) (2) (ii). This provision should raise concerns about the
competence of remediation personnel. Lenders must choose wisely when they de-
cide to clean up a site.
143. 40 C.F.R § 300.1100(c) (2) (ii).
144. Id.
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foreseeable acts or omissions of any .. third party
145
For purposes of the innocent landowner defense, CERCLA
provides within the definition of the term "contractual relation-
ship," that if at the time a defendant acquired a facility he did not
know and had no reason to know that there were any hazardous
substances disposed of at the facility, then liability shall not at-
tach. 146 In order to establish a lack of knowledge under this provi-
sion, a defendant amust have undertaken all appropriate inquiries
into the previous ownership of the property consistent with good
commercial business practices or customary practice within the in-
dustry in an effort to minimize liability.147
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia recently vacated the EPA lender rule, declaring that it was for
the courts and not EPA to interpret the scope of CERCLA.148 In
Kelley v. EPA,' 49 the petitioners challenged EPA's ability to regulate
the scope of the lender exemption. 50 In deciding that EPA had no
interpretive authority regarding the lender liability rule, the court
held that while Congress delegated broad administrative power
over the statute, it was EPA's burden to demonstrate "either explicit
or implicit evidence of congressional intent to delegate interpretive
authority."' 5 ' The Kelley court reasoned that because private parties
could sue for contribution independent of actions taken by EPA,
courts and not EPA are charged with determining the scope of the
liability exemption under CERCLA section 101(20) (A).152 Thus,
the court vacated EPA's rule.155
Since to date no further policy statements have been issued,
the EPA rule can at best be viewed as only one litigant's opinion
145. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
146. CERCLA § 101(35)(A),(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A),(B).
147. Id.
148. See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 900
(1995).
149. 15 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995).
150. Id. at 1105. The petitioners, the State of Michigan and the Chemical
Manufacturer's Association, stood to benefit from allowing contribution and in-
demnity actions against lenders. Id. at 1104-05.
151. Id. at 1105 (citing Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299, 1303
(D.C. Cir. 1991)).
152. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1107; see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638,
650 (1990) (rejecting Department of Labor's authority to adjudicate private rights
of action); 126 Cong. Rec. 30,932 (1980) (Sen. Randolph states that liability issues
not resolved by act are to be governed by common law).
153. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1109.
1995]
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(albeit an important one). However, given the expanded applica-
tion of the lender exemption by the post-Fleet Factors decisions, the
rule does not bear as much practical importance as it might have
otherwise.1M
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL DUE DILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
There are no universally accepted practices upon which a
lender can base its environmental review process. While EPA's rule
requires a lender to conduct pre-loan audits as a condition to quali-
fying for protection under the CERCLA secured lender exemption,
and to ensure sound operation of the borrower's facility by cor-
recting any unreasonable environmental practices, these require-
ments are not specifically incorporated into the statute. The lack of
uniform standards is explained, in part, by the fact that EPA does
not want to discourage voluntary auditing by promulgating strict
standards which may not take into account factors which vary from
one industry or organization to the next.1 55
Nonetheless, lenders are well advised to consider the results of
a due diligence review or environmental audit before taking steps
to either approve a loan in the first instance or to foreclose on col-
lateral. 156 It follows, therefore, that when analyzing title search re-
suits, a lender should look into any obvious party which could have
contaminated the property. When drafting the loan documents, it
would be prudent to provide coverage for environmental compli-
ance and indemnity of the lender to fund a cleanup. Finally, when
foreclosing, a lender should gather as much information as it feels
necessary to determine Whether a waste problem exists. For a resi-
dence, this may entail simply reviewing the title search and driving
by the property to identify any obvious hazards. 15 7
An industrial property search will generally entail a more thor-
ough analysis. A buyer should be sought out and lined up ahead of
time whenever possible. Moreover, a clean-up plan should be con-
templated and cooperation with government officials considered.
154. For a thorough analysis of EPA's ability to promulgate the lender exemp-
tion in light of Supreme Court rulings, see Note, James S. Flood, FPA s Interpretive
Rule on CERCLA § 101(20)(A): Does it Create a Safe Harbor For Secured Lenders?, 24
RUTGERS LJ. 511, 515-16 & n.33 (1993).
155. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,007
(1986) [hereinafter Auditing Policy Statement].
156. Id.
157. For a discussion of the specific environmental problems residential lend-
ers are likely to encounter, see generally Sharp, supra note 76 and accompanying
text, regarding specific environmental problems which residential lenders are
likely to encounter.
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EPA policy takes into account on a case-by-case basis the "honest
and genuine efforts" of entities to avoid and promptly correct viola-
tions and underlying environmental problems, particularly when
the entity was not required to report or record the problem.' 58 In
addition, courts have been less prone to impose liability on lenders
who: (1) transfer property quickly; and (2) attempt to aid rather
than hinder waste removal activities.' 59 Both a due diligence review
and an environmental audit cover the issue of hazardous chemical
contamination on a site. The due diligence review is normally con-
ducted as part of a real estate transaction. 160 Environmental audits,
on the other hand, are conducted to evaluate compliance with envi-
ronmental laws in order to bring site management practices into
line with environmental laws for purposes of minimizing risk, insur-
ing the property, and other nontransactional reasons.' 6 '
Sales of residential property from foreclosure may require
more care given the consumer nature of the transaction. 162 A
lender selling property to consumers who have little sophistication
in the environmental area has a duty to disclose latent environmen-
tal defects.' 63  The Federal National Mortgage Association
("FNMA") provides a set of guidelines for a lender when selling
mortgages to FNMA in the secondary mortgage market. The first
type of analysis is called a Phase I Assessment, which involves review
of records including title searches, permits issued by state and fed-
eral environmental agencies, zoning restrictions or special uses,
and lender file reviews. 64
Most state environmental laws are concerned with industrial
rather than residential property. Following their requirements will
alert a lender to potential state law risks.165 A site inspection, how-
ever, is also recommended for a residential property because: (1)
an owner may be conducting illegal waste storage practices; (2) the
land in question may have unusual characteristics such as being ad-
jacent to a body of water indicating possible run-off problems; or
158. Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 155, at 25,007.
159. For a discussion of caselaw addressing lender liability, see supra notes 16-
88, and accompanying text.
160. Sharp, supra note 76, at 240.
161. NICHOLAS A. ROBINSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF REAL PROPERTY
§§ 25.02, 25-33 (REv. Nov. 9, 1990).
162. Sharp, supra note 75.
163. Id.
164. See ROBINSON, supra note 161, §§ 25-33.
165. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:lk-6 -:1k-13; (sale of industrial real property
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(3) there may be an adjacent property with potential hazards which
could effect the property in question. 166 Ideally, the lender will
have the cooperation of the site owner when physically inspecting
the property. Even if cooperation is not attainable in a given situa-
tion, the lender's agent can still detect any unusual odors or discol-
oration of the soil or other unusual physical characteristics by
performing a drive-by search. 167 Other possible alternatives to a
site inspection include checking with local authorities for com-
plaints by neighbors, looking for surface and underground fuel
storage tanks or nearby electrical transformers, and locating sani-
tary and other discharge pipes in the immediate area.
While expert participation in the Phase I review is recom-
mended, an experienced loan officer or attorney is also capable of
gathering the documentation and doing the site inspection neces-
sary for purposes of discovering Phase I environmental problems.
If questions are raised regarding a particular hazard, or uncertainty
develops after checkinfg with local, state and federal authorities and
reviewing records concerning the property, a Phase II assessment
should be performed. 168 In addition, EPA suggests that the follow-
ing elements are necessary to effectuate an internal auditing
procedure:
I. Explicit top management support for environmental
auditing and commitment to follow-up on audit findings.
II. An environmental auditing function independent of
audited activities....
III. Adequate team staffing and auditor training....
IV. Explicit audit program objectives, scope, resources
and frequency....
V. A process which collects, analyzes, interprets and doc-
uments information sufficient to achieve audit
objectives....
166. ROBINSON, supra note 161, at §§ 25-33.
167. Id.
168. While there is no single standard for environmental evaluation of real
property, the Federal National Mortgage Association Multi-Family Environmental
Hazard Procedure Guidelines shed some light on the topic. The guidelines are
used by FNMA when purchasing mortgages in the secondary mortgage market.
These guidelines do not provide an answer to the environmental evaluation prob-
lem, but they do give a lender an indication of certain questions to ask, and, de-
pending on the type of property involved, whether or not an environmental
consultant should be retained to evaluate a given property.
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VI. A process which includes specific procedures to
promptly prepare candid, clear and appropriate written
reports on audit findings, corrective actions, and sched-
ules for implementation....
VII. A process which includes quality assurance proce-
dures to assure the accuracy and thoroughness of environ-
mental audits ... 169
Finally, it is recommended that an attorney oversee the environ-
mental evaluation process in order to shield the information from
public scrutiny with the attorney-client privilege. 170
VII. CONCLUSION
CERCLA was enacted 15 years ago to facilitate cleanup of toxic
waste sites. Congress, noting that lenders had little or nothing to
do with contaminating real property, attempted to carve an excep-
tion to the remedial legislation by enacting section 101 (20) (A) of
CERCLA. While manufacturers and other groups have utilized
CERCLA and other laws to draw lenders into the environmental
litigation quagmire, recently the courts have begun to enforce the
original spirit of the lender exemption.
The broadening of the lender exemption has been incremen-
tal at best. This author hopes that the liability loopholes are closed.
Unless a lender itself is directly responsible for the contamination,
there is no sound basis to hold them liable for pollution caused by
other parties. Moreover, lenders should be encouraged to make
loans to facilitate economic growth. Any further narrowing of CER-
CLA section 101 (20) (A) will not solve the underlying problem of
100 years of improper waste disposal practices. If lenders inject less
money into the economy, fewer businesses will have fewer dollars to
spend on cleaning up the environment.
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